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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, 3.1 million Americans were victimized by
smartphone theft, nearly double the total of a year before. 2
The problem is particularly acute in major cities, where
smartphone theft is now involved in 30 to 40 percent of all
robberies. 3 In San Francisco, smartphones were stolen in
more than half of total robberies in 2012. 4 These thefts cost
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consumers approximately $30 billion a year according to
the FCC, 5 and law enforcement officials worry that they
pose significant public safety costs as well. This is not
hard to believe, given that 68% of theft victims would put
themselves in some degree of danger to recover their
phone. 6 With 1 in 10 device owners now victims, 7 the
shocking growth of smartphone theft and its attendant
financial and safety costs has created an apparent
epidemic.
But, is this theft problem really unique to
smartphones? The increase in stolen smartphones may
simply reflect the increase in smartphone ownership. In
other words, thieves may not specifically plan ahead and
single out phones to steal. Other electronic devices such as
laptops and tablets are also stolen regularly, but
smartphone theft may occur at a greater rate for a variety
of reasons: they are smaller, easier to mine data from,
easier to repurpose post-theft, and people carry them
around more routinely with less precaution.
Whether the theft problem is unique to
smartphones or not, a solution that reduces theft of
smartphones in particular and electronic devices in general
is desirable if it is possible. Perhaps the most obvious
response is to make stolen phones less valuable. If thieves
cannot access owner data or connect phones to cellular or
Wi-Fi networks, they may be less inclined to risk stealing a
smartphone. This is the crux of the leading anti-theft
proposal. By mandating implementation of a “kill switch”
that can remotely disable a phone’s essential features,
legislatures and public officials hope to disincentivize
stealing and reverse the theft trend.
This paper analyzes the potential efficacy of current
proposals to deter smartphone theft and the broader
implications they may have. It surveys arguments of
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leading stakeholders, examines the relevant literature on
technological feasibility and consumer behavior, and
assesses the potential pitfalls and shortcomings in
implementing a cohesive, effective policy. Developing a
sound theft-deterrence policy requires clarity on and a
better understanding of kill switch technology, other
potential approaches such as carrier registries, smartphone
theft psychology, and the mechanics of the smartphone
black market. This paper represents the first attempt at
studying and answering these questions.

I. HISTORY OF THE KILL SWITCH DEBATE
A. A CALL TO MANDATE KILL SWITCHES
SAMSUNG’S RESPONSE

AND

The movement to mandate the deployment of a kill
switch, a technological method to render a stolen
smartphone and its data unusable, first gained prominence
in 2012 when smartphone theft began increasing rapidly.
The Secure Our Smartphones (SOS) campaign, led by New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and San
Francisco District Attorney George Gascon, gathered
supporters around the country as it pressured phone
carriers and manufacturers to introduce a default kill
switch in new phones. 8
Following this pressure, on July 18, 2013, Samsung
proposed adding the LoJack security system, including a
kill switch designed by Absolute Software, to its
smartphones at an additional cost to consumers. 9 The
LoJack system would work through a desktop app and
code buried with the phone’s firmware. However, because
most smartphones in the U.S. are sold by carriers,

Office of the N.Y. Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman,
Secure Our Smartphones (S.O.S.),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/feature/secure-our-smartphones-sos.
9 Martyn Williams, U.S. Carriers Rejected ‘Kill Switch’ Technology
Last Year, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 24, 2014 08:42 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9246557/U.S._carri
ers_rejected_39_kill_switch_39_technology_last_year.
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Samsung needed the carriers’ approval to pre-install
LoJack on phones. None of the five major carriers
agreed. 10

B. CTIA’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
THERETO

AND

RESPONSES

Carriers and manufacturers, through their
representative CTIA—The Wireless Association, initially
denounced the SOS kill switch initiative and instead
created a collaborative registry aimed at eliminating the
stolen phones resale market.
Eventually, however,
intensifying scrutiny prompted the CTIA to modify its
position. It recently created the Smartphone Anti-Theft
Voluntary Commitment, in which signatories declare their
intent to make kill switch functionality available on all of
their new phones by July 2015. 11
But many kill switch advocates argue that this
voluntary commitment falls short. Citing the need for
ubiquity to ward off thieves, consumer rights advocates
and a handful of state legislatures have pushed for
mandatory, rather than voluntary, adoption of kill
switches. One such bill, California’s S.B. 962, finally
passed the state senate in May 2014 (and was signed into
law on August 25, 2014) 12 after Apple, Samsung, Microsoft,
and Google withdrew opposition on the conditions that
the implementation deadline be pushed back to July 2015
and tablets be dropped from the bill. These companies
already include software on their phones that allows
owners to lock or erase devices from afar, but they
generally accord with the CTIA’s position of keeping anti-

Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New
York, (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/agschneiderman-requests-information-leading-wireless-carriersdecision-reject-anti.
11 Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, CTIA—THE
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntaryguidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.
12 H.R. 962, 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
10
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theft measures voluntary and up to the discretion of
consumers.

C. FINDING A WAY FORWARD
While most interested parties in the debate thus
appear to endorse a kill switch option, kill switch
implementation is not failsafe. The question remains
whether current statutory kill switch mandate proposals
“will effectively deter theft without jeopardizing public
safety, personal privacy, and civil liberties, or causing
other undesirable consequences.” 13 It is entirely possible
that a kill switch solution could create as many problems
as it solves.

II. OPINIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS ON KILL SWITCHES
The debate over curbing smartphone theft has
engendered a good deal of controversy. Some legislators
have unabashedly attacked carriers and manufacturers for
opposing a public safety law in order to retain profits
arising from replacement of stolen phones. The carriers
and manufacturers respond by arguing that they present
consumers with a variety of security options, to which a
mandatory kill switch would only be a costly and
burdensome addition. On the sidelines of the debate are a
number of privacy activists and technologists who worry
that mandating kill switches may enable the possibility of
widespread hacking or discourage innovation. Finally,
smartphone owners provide insights about feasibility of
security options with their relative apathy towards antitheft measures.

13 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications
Committee, March 24, 2014,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis
tab, then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And
Communications”).

COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?

35

A. LEGISLATORS AND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICIALS
SUPPORT STRONG KILL SWITCHES
Following the beginning of the Secure Our
Smartphones campaign, New York Comptroller Thomas
DiNapoli publicly pressured Google, Microsoft, Apple,
and Samsung to declare what they were doing to “assure
public officials that [they are] acting responsibly” in
response to the rise in smartphone theft or else face
divestment of nearly $3 billion from the state of New
York. 14 The comments confronted the companies with
acting “disinterested when it comes to collaborating with
law enforcement agencies in the effort to develop a
meaningful technological solution that would effectively
eliminate the secondary market in which criminal elements
realize their profits.” 15
Following a decision by the major carriers to reject
Samsung’s kill switch in late 2013, supporters of a
mandatory kill switch became even less diplomatic in their
allegations.
San Francisco District Attorney George
Gascón accused the carriers of rejecting the Samsung
solution “so they could continue to make money hand
over fist on insurance premiums.” 16 Insurance and phone
replacement costs are major components of carrier profits,
comprising $7.8 billion and $30 billion in revenue,
respectively, of the $69 billion the industry nets every
year. 17 Captain Jason Cherniss of the San Francisco Police

Letters from Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller of the State of
New York, to Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung (June 11,
2013),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/features/sos/
SOS-Letters.pdf.
15 Id.
16 Paul Wagenseil, Smartphone Kill Switch: What It Is, How it Might
Work, TOM’S GUIDE (May 14, 2014 9:40AM),
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ smartphone-kill-switchfaq,news-18772.html (internal quotations omitted, quoting
Gascón).
17 Rachel Swan, The Life of a Stolen Phone: For the Smartphone
Industry, Theft is Part of the Business Model, S.F. WEEKLY (April 23,
14
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Department says the police have “tried to blow the whistle
on this for years . . . [while] companies have had the ability
to prevent for years . . . [and] people have been violently
robbed - even killed - and millions of dollars have changed
hands on the black market.” 18 Secure Our Smartphones
leader Eric Schneiderman blasted the carriers for
“knowingly dismiss[ing] technology that could save
lives.” 19

B. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY IMPLEMENTATION
But the carriers (and manufacturers) see kill
switches as not only technologically uncertain, but also as
potentially becoming conduits of new problems. The
CTIA has expressed concern that ubiquitous kill switches
would give hackers or other undesired parties the ability
to disable entire groups of phones, with particular
susceptibility for “random customers as retaliation by a
variety of persons or entities.” 20 Manufacturers claim that
they have already made commercially available and
promoted affordable anti-theft solutions, including
Apple’s Find My iPhone and Activation Lock and
Samsung’s Reactivation Lock. The major carriers of the
CTIA, though initially rejecting wholesale Samsung’s kill
switch proposal in 2013, recently agreed to make available
kill-switch solutions on a consumer-voluntary basis. 21
This voluntary-as-opposed-to-mandatory proposal
accords with the position of many technologists and
privacy rights activists who worry that consumers may be

2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/2014-04-23/news/
smartphone-theft-apple-at-t-iphone/full/.
18 Id.
19 Schneiderman, supra note 10.
20 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the
Answer (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer
.pdf.
21 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Smartphone Anti-Theft
Voluntary Commitment (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntaryguidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.
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coerced into increased susceptibility to hackers. Further,
consumers already have a variety of security tools
available to them, and legally sanctioning more pathways
for Big Brother (or Anonymous) to intrude on consumers’
ability to communicate is concerning, particularly in light
of recent crackdowns in Egypt, BART protests, and
Occupy Wall Street. In this regard, consumer safety may
be diminished by an inability to reach emergency services
or dependent contacts.
Some technologists also fear that mandatory
technology may create a barrier to entry for smaller
innovators in the smartphone industry or even more
simply create more costs than benefits. In comments filed
with the California Senate, the San Jose Silicon Valley
Chamber of Commerce reminded legislators “to be
sensitive to the regulatory environment necessary for
innovation” and asserted that different technology
mandates in states across the country “could create
considerable market barriers for innovative manufacturers
and the consumers they serve, and mandating technology
is usually a recipe for the creation of an anticompetitive
and anti-consumer choice environment.” 22

C. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR PROVIDES LITTLE CLARITY ON
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANDATORY
KILL SWITCH
In the midst of this debate, smartphone owners-perhaps the stakeholders with the most at stake--seem to
collectively demonstrate the least bit of interest. Less than
half of smartphone users secure their phones with a
homescreen passcode, and among those that do, the most
popular passcodes are among the simplest: 1111, 0000, and

22 Comments of San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce in
Senate Floor Analysis, May 7, 2014, California State Senate,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill
_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis Tab,
then click the link titled “05/07/14 – Senate Floor Analysis).
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1234. 23 Aggregating the passcode with other phone
security measures such as antivirus software and data
backup, 34% of smartphone owners take no measures at
all. 24 This seeming indifference may support the notion
that a mandatory anti-theft solution could produce radical
effects, but it may also reveal that smartphone users
simply prefer more straightforward usage with fewer
security barriers. Regardless of what it means, interested
parties on both sides of the table have mobilized consumer
behavior data to support their positions. Currently
proposed kill switch bills in state and federal legislatures,
for instance, base their rationales in consumer protection.

III. HOW THE LEGISLATION CONCEIVES
SWITCHES

OF

KILL

While the various bills 25 active in state legislatures
and Congress differ in how they describe the ideal features
of kill switches, they all allude to kill switches vaguely as a
sort of “technological solution.” The pending federal bill
goes even further, exempting from the mandate any
smartphone provider that incorporates technology that
“accomplishes the functional equivalent of the [defined
technological] function.” 26 By keeping the definition
broad, the bills enable companies to use technology
compatible with their business and design strategies,
hence making it more palatable to comply with the
mandate. However, the broad definitional scope also
reflects a degree of legislative uncertainty on what
constitutes the most effective functionality. Reflecting this
point, the five pending and passed bills--California,

Corinne Iozzio, Kill Switches Will Save Your Smartphone,
POPULAR SCIENCE (May 5, 2014),
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/kill-switches-willsave-your-smartphone.
24 Stephen Schenck, US Smartphone Thefts Explode, Nearly
Doubling Since 2012, POCKETNOW (April 18, 2014, 5:18 PM),
http://pocketnow.com/2014/04/18/smartphone-theft.
25 See Appendix for excerpts of selected bill text.
26 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong.
(2014).
23
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Minnesota, New York, Illinois, and the federal bill--all
have important differences.
While all of the bills agree that a kill switch must
involve software or hardware (or a combination of both)
that can render inoperable the essential features of the
device to an unauthorized user, they vary in their
interpretation of “inoperability” and “essential features.”
The bills generally accord that the kill switch should
disable voice communications, Internet accessibility, and
application functionality, but the proposed Illinois and
federal bills go further to clarify that this must be achieved
“even if the device is turned off or has the data storage
medium removed.” 27 In this regard, the Illinois and
federal bills would require a permanent solution that
prevents re-programmability after the phone is rendered
inoperable.
The treatment of data also reveals the bills’
different conceptions of kill switch functionality. The
California bill, for instance, is silent on the technology’s
effect on user data, whereas the other bills require the kill
switch to either lock or disable the stored data. The
Minnesota bill requires the kill switch to lock all data, but
retain future accessibility, while the Illinois bill would
require permanent removal. The federal bill splits the
difference between the two and leaves the option open to
manufacturers and providers.
Compliance enforcement also varies from bill to
bill. Each bill, aside from Illinois’s, supports a per-phone
monetary penalty levelled against those who manufacture
and sell non-conforming phones, while Illinois would
require violating providers to insure the phones for theft at
no cost to the customer.
Minnesota’s bill contains
additional provisions that prevent purchasers of used or
secondhand phones from buying in cash and requires
these buyers to keep records of their purchases.
In total, the current legislative proposals are united
in calling for a mandate on some sort of technological
solution that would help consumers render some subset of

Id. See also IL S.B. 3539 (“SIM card or data storage medium
removed”).
27
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key features inoperable on a stolen phone. The various
approaches on specifics, from definitional differences to
dealing with data on a permanent or reversible basis,
underscores some of the uncertainty on how a kill switch
could work most effectively.

IV. TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED
KILL SWITCHES

WITH IMPLEMENTING

The state and federal kill switch legislation as well
as the Voluntary Commitment from the CTIA both suffer
from a dearth of detail about technical specifications and
how a kill switch would be implemented. The bills simply
call for any hardware or software “technological solution”
that is mandatory and can survive a factory reset. 28
However, a kill switch solution implemented entirely in
software will likely not work flawlessly, especially if the
software is implemented at a high level of abstraction—in
the operating system (OS) or as an app.

A. KILL SWITCHES IMPLEMENTED IN SOFTWARE
Software kill switches depend on users running the
latest OS and software patches necessary to enable the kill
switch feature to work. For example, Apple’s Find My
iPhone 29 app and Activation Lock 30 feature in iOS 7 were
designed to function as a kill switch. Once enabled,
Activation Lock is designed to make a stolen iPhone
unusable even if the phone is reset. However, only 85% of
iPhones ran iOS 7 at the time the first smartphone bills got
introduced. 31 Therefore, there was still a large chance that

See, e.g., H.R. 962, 2013 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1) (Cal.
2013).
29 Apple Computer Inc., Find My iPhone,
http://www.apple.com/icloud/find-my-iphone.html.
30 Apple Computer Inc., iCloud: Activation Lock,
http://support.apple.com/kb/PH13695.
31 Christian Zibreg, According to Apple, 85 percent of iPhone, iPod
touch and iPad devices run iOS 7, IDOWNLOADBLOG (Mar. 24,
2014), http://www.idownloadblog.com/2014/03/24/apple-85percent-devices-ios-7.
28
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a stolen iPhone either did not run iOS 7 or have the Find
My iPhone app enabled. For example, a recent theft victim
had shut off the Find My iPhone app after reading about
how it had been abused by a hacker to remote-wipe tech
writer Mat Honan’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop. 32 With the
large number of smartphone offerings, OSs, and app
versions on the market today, designing a set of
reasonably foolproof kill switch apps that have similar
levels of protection for users across industry platforms will
require a significant standards-setting initiative and
frequent
communication
between
smartphone
manufacturers and carriers on bug fixes, technology
updates, and software patches.
California’s kill switch bill and the CTIA’s
Voluntary Commitment would require any smartphone
manufactured in the United States for retail sale after July
1, 2015 to have a kill switch (the latter on a voluntary
commitment).
However, most users keep their
smartphone models for two to three years. Hence, even
after July 1, 2015, there will be millions of smartphones
that were purchased previously running older OS versions
that do not support the kill switch. Moreover, iPhones
running iOS 7 (with the kill switch) look almost identical
to models without it. Therefore, smartphone thieves will
likely not be deterred by kill switches for a few years after
July 1, 2015, and will take the chance that a given
smartphone does not have a properly functioning kill
switch. Even if a stolen iPhone has the kill switch app
installed and functional, if a user waits too long to run
Find My iPhone, that can give the thief time to unload the
device. (The average duration of time from theft to
recognition of theft is one hour.) 33

Rob Pegoraro, Will Apple's ‘kill switch’ tamp down iPhone thefts?,
USA TODAY (May 4, 2014, 7:00 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2014/05/04
/will-apples-kill-switch-tamp-down-iphone-thefts/8577215.
33 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7,
2014), https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phonetheft-in-america.
32
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B. SOFTWARE KILL SWITCHES CAN BE BROKEN INTO
Thieves may also be able to defeat kill switches if
the user has not installed the latest software security patch.
For example, Apple recently put out a security fix for a
vulnerability that allowed a thief to disable Find My
iPhone on iOS 7 without a password. 34 That defense was
also circumvented in cases where a user did not set a
screen-unlock passcode. 35
Most recently, hackers have even broken into
Apple’s Activation Lock installed on the latest iOS 7 with
all the latest software patches. The two hackers who call
themselves doulCi (iCloud, fashioned roughly backwards),
claimed to have made the workaround “for people who
have retrieved their lost or stolen iDevice, in an effort to
recover access to contacts, email, notes, and more.” 36 The
system works by “plugging [an] iPhone or iPad into a
computer and altering a file inside . . . trick[ing] the device
into connecting to the hackers’ server instead” and causing
the phone to unlock. 37 Shortly following the release of the
doulCi hack, pictures on social media appeared
“show[ing] that thousands of locked iPhones around the
world [were] bypassed using the tool just [in the first
day].” 38 Most of the tweets thanking the two hackers come
from outside of the U.S, where stolen smartphones are
shipped and sold at a premium on the black market. 39 For

34 Carly Page, iOS 7 Exploit Disables Find My Iphone Without a
Password, THE INQUIRER (Feb. 7, 2014, 1:10 PM),
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2327573/ios-7exploit-disables-find-my-iphone-without-a-password.
35 Pegoraro, supra note 32.
36 Stephanie Mlot, Hackers Breach Apple’s Activation Lock, PC
MAGAZINE (May 22, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2458399,00.asp.
37 Jose Pagliery, Hackers Can ‘Un-Brick’ Stolen iPhones,
CNNMONEY TECH 30 (May 21, 2014, 1:37 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/21/technology/security/iclou
d-hack/index.html.
38 Id.
39 Alex Heath, Apple Too Late to Stop Massive iCloud Breach,
Hackers Claim, CULT OF MAC (May 21, 2014, 4:46 PM),
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example, an iPhone 5S that costs $707 in the US costs
$1,090 in Jordan and $1,196 in Brazil. 40 The doulCi hack
suggests that software kill switches on phones are certainly
not immune, even from the work of a couple of rogue
hackers.

C. REMOTE ACTIVATION OF KILL SWITCHES
A true software kill switch, as opposed to a simple
lock-and-wipe app, would require sending a signal to the
phone over the cellular network or the Internet to “brick”
the phone by deleting the OS or by sending out a poisoned
firmware update. Absent of physical damage to the
hardware, the phone could still be made functional by
installing a new OS or by using special tools to fix the
firmware. 41
iPhones, in particular, are “jailbroken”
routinely, with the smartphone running a knock-off OS.
Therefore, a purely software-based approach to render a
smartphone forever nonfunctional is unlikely to work.
A kill switch implemented in software can also be
avoided. A thief would have to shut the smartphone off
immediately after he steals it, which most experienced
thieves already do to avoid tracking software. The thief
could alternatively place the stolen smartphone into a
Faraday Bag 42 that blocks Wi-Fi, cellular, and GPS signals
and wait until he reached a location without a cellular
signal, e.g., a metal shed or basement. At that point, the
SIM card can be removed and discarded, the phone can be
turned on, the data wiped, and the 15-digit International

http://www.cultofmac.com/280189/icloud-hacker-calls-applesresponse-little-late.
40 Swan, supra note 17.
41 Jesse Emspak, Why a smartphone ‘kill switch’ won't deter theft,
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug 27, 2013, 02:19 AM),
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/gadgetselectronics/stories/why-a-smartphone-kill-switch-wont-detertheft.
42 Kelsey D. Atherton, Hide From GPS With This Signal-Blocking
Phone Case, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:15 PM),
http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2013-08/how-protectyourself-your-phone.
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Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number changed. 43 The
carrier network, and kill switch that depends on it, would
be totally ineffective.

D. KILL SWITCHES EMBEDDED IN HARDWARE
Samsung proposed a more permanent solution, the
Absolute LoJack kill switch, 44 to carriers in 2013, but the
carriers rejected the proposal. The Absolute LoJack
method embeds the kill switch in the smartphone’s BIOS
(firmware) that can withstand a factory reset and wiping
or replacing the hard drive. However, hacker websites 45
offer instructions for computer-savvy hackers on how to
edit a smartphone’s BIOS to disable LoJack. Hence, a truly
tamper-proof kill switch would have to be either
embedded in read-only memory (ROM) or built into the
integrated circuits (ICs) on the motherboard itself. The
logic on an IC could be programmed to (1) cause the IC to
malfunction; (2) reset the memories; or (3) destroy the IC
by creating a short in the circuit. Because the kill switch
would be within the IC, detecting it and disabling it would
be near impossible. 46 In addition, the kill switch would
have to be embedded on every motherboard manufactured
so that if a thief tried to replace the motherboard on a
smartphone, the new replacement motherboard would
also have the kill switch. At this point, working around
the kill switch would still be possible for the thief.

Emspak, supra note 41.
Absolute Persistent Security Software. The Only Solution That Can
Survive a Factory Reset, ABSOLUTE SOFTWARE,
http://lojack.absolute.com/en/persistent (last visited May 30,
2014).
45 See, e.g., How to Remove Computrace LoJack, FREAKY ACRES,
http://www.freakyacres.com/remove_computrace_lojack (last
visited May 30, 2014).
46 Email from Mark Tehranipoor, Charles H. Knapp Associate
Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of
Connecticut, to authors (May 30, 2014, 11:06 AM) (on file with
authors).
43
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However, because a new motherboard costs upwards of
$100, 47 it might serve as a sufficient deterrence to theft.

E. HARDWARE REDESIGNS THAT COULD WORK
Modern electronic devices, such as smartphones,
have sleep states that are in between fully on and fully off.
In sleep mode, some circuits on the smartphone are
powered up and others are powered down. 48 “These
modes often allow the device to wake up autonomously if
certain conditions are met, such as pressing a certain key
or even receiving certain data over the Internet. . . .” 49
Therefore, a kill switch that could be activated to wake up
and “brick” the smartphone even when the smartphone
were switched off by a thief would be useful. In addition,
a hardware redesign to thwart thieves that remove the
smartphone battery to evade tracking could be to insert
secondary power sources within the apparatus. “Some
phones [already] use an additional battery for memory
management; it’s unclear whether this battery could be
used by logging and/or tracking systems. . . .” 50 Such a
secret secondary power source could be used to power
tracking apps and the kill switch.

F. FOOLPROOF BUT EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS
Militaries around the world have designed “remote
shut-down” solutions on defense systems since at least
2008 to disable ICs on equipment that might fall into
hostile hands. These generally consist of kill switches or

iPhone 5 Replacement Motherboards, EBAY,
http://www.ebay.com (search “iphone 5 replacement
motherboard”) (last visited May 30, 2014).
48 Heather Murphy, Why Snowden Asked Visitors in Hong Kong to
Refrigerate Their Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013, 9:41 AM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-snowdensvisitors-put-their-phones-in-the-fridge/?_r=0&pagewanted=all
(quoting Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Technologist, Electronic
Frontier Foundation).
49 Id.
50 Id.
47
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backdoors. A military-style kill switch manipulates the
system’s software or hardware to cause the system to die
outright, for example, to shut off an F-35’s missilelaunching electronics. 51 A backdoor, on the other hand,
lets the designer gain access to the system to disable or
enable a specific function. Because a backdoor does not
shut down the entire system, hostile users remain unaware
of the intrusion. For example, a designer could use it to
bypass battlefield radio encryption. Similarly, smartphone
manufacturers or carriers could use a backdoor to continue
tracking a thief while blocking access to the owner’s
sensitive data. However, military-style designs, while
foolproof, would likely prove too expensive for
commercial smartphones unless breakthroughs in
technology and design occur.
Boeing recently filed documents with the FCC to
build a tamper-proof android smartphone it calls the
“Black” phone. The “Black phone will be sold primarily to
government agencies and companies . . . related to defense
and homeland security,” says a letter accompanying the
filing. 52 There are no serviceable parts on Boeing’s Black
phone and any attempted servicing or replacing of parts
would destroy the product. The phone is sealed with
epoxy around the casing and with screws, the heads of
which are covered with tamper proof covering to identify
attempted disassembly. While such a device would
provide high security indeed, the need for commercial
devices to be serviced or repaired likely precludes a
specialized solution like Boeing’s for commercial

Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 1,
2008, 7:57 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-forthe-kill-switch.
52 Letter from Bruce A. Olcott, The Boeing Company, Supplemented
Request for Confidential Treatment
FCC Identification Number H8V-BLK1 (Model: BLACK), to Joe
Dichoso, Chief Equipment Authorization Branch, Office of
Engineering and Technology, Federal Communications
Commission,
https://apps.fcc.gov/eas/GetApplicationAttachment.html?id=2
202965.
51
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smartphones.
In addition, Boeing will not provide
technical and operational information about the product to
the general public for security purposes. 53 Technical
information distributed at trade shows will be protected
by non-disclosure agreements. With the proliferation of
hacker sites instructing the public on jailbreaking
smartphones and evading kill switches, commercial
smartphone companies might soon decide to follow this
route in the future.
Finally, researchers at Rice University and the
University of California, Los Angeles recently invented a
new method to protect integrated circuits (IC) against
piracy. The new method exploits the inherent variability
in modern IC manufacturing to create a unique identifier
for each IC and integrate the identifier into the IC’s
functionality. 54 However, while this novel method solves
the IMEI erasing problem and is attack-resilient, it would
likely lead to a large overhead cost for smartphone
manufacturers and would be difficult to standardize across
smartphone platforms.

V. NON-KILL-SWITCH SOLUTION: CARRIER REGISTRIES
AND MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT
A. CARRIER REGISTRY OPERATION
Seeking to deflect legislation that would mandate
kill switches for all smartphones, and seeking to avoid
dealing with the technical challenges enumerated above,
U.S. carriers implemented databases in November 2013
that use unique GSM and LTE (advanced GSM)
smartphone ID numbers to prevent stolen smartphones
from being re-activated on GSM or LTE networks in the

Id.
Yousra Alkabani, et al., Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy
Prevention and Digital Rights Management, Proceedings of the Int’l
Conference on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits
and Systems 674-77 (2007),
http://www.cs.ucla.edu/~miodrag/papers/Alkabani_ICCAD_
2007.pdf.
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U.S. and on appropriate international LTE networks. 55 At
present in the U.S., consumers that lose their smartphones
may call their service provider and have service
suspended to the smartphone. 56 However, it is the
consumer’s responsibility to know the device’s make,
model number, serial number, and unique device
identification number (either the International Mobile
Equipment Identifier (IMEI) or the Mobile Equipment
Identifier (MEID) number). 57
Different smartphone
models and carriers may use GSM networks, CDMA
networks, LTE networks, or a mix of the three. 58
Therefore, a stolen smartphone that is blocked on one
registry could be activated on a registry using a different
network standard.
Additionally, consulting the registries and blocking
activation of phones reported as stolen is a voluntary action
of carriers. 59 Remote phone location, locking, and datawiping services depend entirely on whether the
manufacturer and carrier provides them on the particular
smartphone model; the features are not uniformly offered
on all models or by all carriers. 60 Manufacturer or third-

Letter from Brian M. Josef, CTIA Stolen Smartphones Status
Update, to Kris Monteith, Acting Bureau Chief, Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission, http://www.ctia.org/docs/defaultsource/default-document-library/july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
56 FCC, How to Report a Lost or Stolen Smart Device,
http://www.fcc.gov/stolen-phones-contact-numbers.
57 FCC, Protect Your Mobile Device,
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/stolen-and-lost-wireless-devices.
58 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
Mobile Communications, http://www.etsi.org/technologiesclusters/technologies/mobile.
59 Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov't rep says next two iPhones were
designed under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (April 01, 2013, 12:03
PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govtrep-says-next-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.
60 See e.g., AT&T, Replace your lost or stolen device and suspend
service,
http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=52993&cv=820&_
requestid=1370759#fbid=COrGqYlcbAL.
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party apps available for some models today can locate a
stolen device from a computer, lock the device to restrict
access, wipe sensitive data from the device, and make the
device emit a loud sound (“scream”) to help the police
locate it. However, carriers and manufacturers are not
required to make such apps available on all phones or on
all networks. 61
Once service is suspended on the smartphone, the
consumer cannot wipe or lock it. Monthly plan charges
continue while service is suspended, and the consumer
must have bought insurance ahead of time to get the
smartphone replaced. 62

B. AUSTRALIA’S REGISTRY PROGRAM HAS PRODUCED
RELATIVE SUCCESS
Australia implemented an IMEI blocking program
a decade ago and has deemed it successful at deterring
theft with “net blocking activity [falling] by nearly 25%
from 169,000 mobile handsets blocked to 127,750 [from
2004-2011] . . . against the background of an 80% increase
in the number of mobile services in operation over this
period.” 63 The IMEI is an integral phone “fingerprint” that
is transmitted whenever the phone is used. Supporters of
an IMEI system claim that it may prove more failsafe than
mandatory kill switches. Speaking with American media,
Randal
Markey
of
the
Australian
Mobile
Telecommunications Association highlighted the ease of
implementing and operating a shared database, which just
requires collaboration amongst carriers, and the relative

Supra note 57.
Id.
63 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Australian
Anti-Theft Mobile Phone Technology Highlighted on U.S. Television
(accessed May 21, 2014),
http://www.amta.org.au/articles/Australian.antitheft.mobile.phone.technology.highlighted.on.US.television
(additionally noting that “[t]he net blocking figures are derived
from subtracting unblocking requests (if the handset is
subsequently found and returned to its legal owner) from
blocking requests”).
61
62
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difficulty for unsophisticated thieves to wipe the IMEI
number. 64

C. PROBLEMS WITH A REGISTRY SOLUTION
However, there are a number of problems plaguing
voluntary carrier registries. Many consumers do not know
about them and do not report stolen phones. Many stores
or fly-by-night operations “will jailbreak a stolen phone
‘no questions asked,’ and thieves can then re-activate the
smartphone with a smaller carrier that is not participating
in the registry.” 65 Carrier registries may thus simply
encourage more black market workarounds. Moreover,
the registries mainly apply in the U.S. and Europe and
could encourage thieves to ship stolen phones to other
areas, where they are more valuable because of export
restrictions and tariffs. Additionally, any projected effect
of IMEI blocking on theft depends on the assumption that
thieves require cell service at all, not just in the registrycovered areas like the U.S. and Europe. Deterrence of an
IMEI system may fail to prevent thieves who simply wish
to profit off of hardware resales, user data mining, or use
of other smartphone functions (digital music, camera, etc.).
A hack-proof mechanism to track and shut down stolen
devices anywhere in the world, regardless of which carrier
is used and without burdening the consumer with the
responsibility of purchasing and downloading apps (or

C.W. Nevius, An Easy Way to Curb Smart Phone Thieves, S.F.
GATE (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/nevius/article/An-easy-wayto-curb-smart-phone-thieves-2344797.php.
65 Josh Harkinson, For Apple and the Phone Companies, "All a Theft
Means Is Another Sale," MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2013 8:58 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/03/stolen-iphonetheft-imsi (describing San Francisco District Attorney George
Gascón’s views on mobile device makers and carriers doing little
to fix the problem).
64
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remembering the smartphone’s 15-digit IMEI number),
would likely be a stronger deterrent to smartphone theft. 66

D. MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT
Growing employee demand for bringing their
personal smartphones to work has driven security-minded
employers to use Mobile Data Management (MDM)
services provided by third-party vendors. MDM provides
increased security for both the devices and the enterprise
they connect to by controlling and protecting the data and
configuration settings for all mobile devices in the
network. 67 MDM solutions can control the apps installed
or available on an employee’s personal smartphone and
disable the camera when on company premises. In
addition, MDM software can lock and wipe a lost or stolen
smartphone, display a message on its screen, and cause it
to emit a high-volume sound. Other options include a
wireless or Bluetooth tether that ties a smartphone to a key
fob and locks or wipes the smartphone if it is separated
from the key fob by a maximum specified distance. 68
However, MDM solutions do not prevent theft; they
merely secure data in the event of theft.

VI.

THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION’S
RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AT DETERRING THEFT

In theory, implementing a default kill switch in
every smartphone is seen as the ideal deterrent to theft
because it would decrease the expected value a thief gets
from stealing while presenting fewer points of confusion

Id. (quoting Kevin Mahaffey, Chief Technology Officer,
Lookout (a maker of anti-theft smartphone apps,) “That seems
like something that is reachable[]”).
67 BYOD Requires Mobile Device Management, INFORMATIONWEEK
(May 5, 2011, 4:25 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/byod-requiresmobile-device-management/d/d-id/1097576?.
68 DEBORAH MORLEY, CHARLES PARKER & JANET LAVINE,
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS : TODAY AND TOMORROW 597
(2004).
66
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to consumers and fewer available black market
workarounds to thieves, fly-by-night operations, or crime
syndicates. However, even assuming that a mandatory
switch could be implemented without technical difficulties
or hacking susceptibility, it may fail to deter thieves for a
number of reasons. At the same time, mandating kill
switches may help correct, for consumer security, apathy
that indirectly encourages theft.
Without more
information about theft incentives and characteristics, the
effects of a kill switch cannot be predicted for certain.

A. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION REQUIRES
MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND MAY MISINTERPRET
THIEVING BEHAVIOR
The premise that putting kill switches in every
phone will stop thieves from stealing phones relies upon a
number of assumptions, including that: (1) thieves
specifically target phones; (2) thieves target phones for
their operability and will actually learn of kill switches;
and (3) thieves cannot benefit from workarounds, such as
hacks, which may pop up from time to time. Because of
legislative requirements, any kill switch underpinning
these assumptions must also be costless to consumers,
leading to another constraint on likely effectiveness since
more expensive and potentially more effective solutions
are foreclosed.

1. THIEVES MAY NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGET PHONES
TO STEAL
First, the increasing incidence of smartphone theft
may belie the conclusion that thieves are specifically
seeking to steal smartphones. While smartphone theft
nearly doubled last year, most of the growth came from
large urban areas. 69 It is entirely possible that spikes in

Samantha Murphy Kelly, What’s the Worst U.S. City for
Smartphone Theft?, Mashable (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/11/08/smartphone-theft-city/
(noting that the top ten locations for smartphone theft are
69

COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?

53

smartphone theft simply reflects the fact that more theft
victims carry visible smartphones in their bags or on their
person, or that smartphone owners have become less
protective of their phones as they take them all over town.
The former point may have some statistically
significant effect, as smartphone ownership has increased
from 45% of Americans in 2012 to 58% by the end of
2013. 70 Part of this may also have to do with the fact that
phones are getting bigger (and thus more apparent to
would-be-thief
passersby):
global
shipments
of
smartphones with screens over 5 inches more than
doubled from 25.6 million in 2012 to 60.4 million in 2013. 71
The latter point is also somewhat reflected in the
available data: according to a recent survey by the mobile
security firm Lookout, 44% of phones are stolen because
they are left behind in a public setting. 72 Though it may be
possible that thieves are purposefully staking out public
places like restaurants, clubs, or workplaces (the three
most common places for phone theft to occur), 73 much of
the rise in theft may simply be attributable to growing
owner forgetfulness that comes along with increased
smartphone usage in public. The fact that the average
victim takes an entire hour to realize a theft 74 probably
indicates that most stolen phones are not quickly swiped

Philadelphia, Seattle, Oakland, Long Beach, Newark, Detroit,
Cleveland, Baltimore, New York, and Boston); Phone Theft in
America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014),
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-theft-inamerica (noting that 55% of thefts occur in urban areas).
70 Device Ownership over Time, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT
(accessed June 2, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/datatrend/mobile/device-ownership/.
71 Global Shipment of Smartphones with a Screen Size of 5 Inches or
Larger, STATISTA (accessed June 2, 2014),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/253350/shipments-ofsmartphones-with-screen-size-5-inches-or-larger/.
72 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7,
2014), https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phonetheft-in-america.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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from right under the owner’s nose. More likely, a
restaurant or club patron leaves her phone on a table and
another patron (or an employee) snatches it after the
owner has left. If these circumstances are more likely to
occur than specific targeting by thieves, then kill switches
may not have their intended deterrent effect since many
thieves seem to not calculate the risks of a theft ahead of
time.

2. THIEVES MAY NOT LEARN ABOUT KILL SWITCHES
OR EVEN CARE ABOUT STOLEN PHONE
OPERABILITY
Even assuming that thieves engage in a risk
calculus before attempting a theft, they may ignore the
presence of a kill switch because they either do not know it
exists or they do not care. It is often so easy to steal a
smartphone that a thief may not mind the probability that
he will be stuck with a bricked device.
Thieves’
opportunism not only takes advantage of the fact that
“people on phones can be so oblivious to surroundings
they are not aware of a potential thief” 75 but also of the 44
% of thefts that occur when phones are left behind in
public settings. In these cases, taking a kill-switch-enabled
phone presents little risk if the thief avoids getting caught,
which most often is independent of the presence of a kill
switch. If the phone is disabled, thieves may simply
discard it and seek to steal another one.
Thieves also have another option. An inoperative
smartphone can still retain some resale value, even if only
for parts. Smartphone OS consultants and developers
have suggested that components like the camera or the
screen could fetch a price making it worthwhile to steal,
while a thief could even damage a stolen smartphone and
then claim the lower price that gadget recycling sites pay
for broken hardware.
Would publicity about the mandatory deployment
of kill switches in smartphones create a powerful enough
deterrent for thieves? That depends on a number of

75

Pegoraro, supra note 32 (internal citations omitted).
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factors, such as (1) whether thieves would find out about
kill switches personally, or through their fences; (2) how
long would it take for theft to decrease once kill switches
are deployed, which in turns depends on how long older
versions of smartphones and OSs remain in use with
consumers after the July 1, 2015 deadline; and (3) what
thieves are stealing smartphones for.
The first factor above is at the center of a debate
between state legislators trying to enact kill switch bills
and manufacturers of security systems. While legislators
want to publicize the deployment of kill switches to deter
theft, security companies such as Absolute (the creator of
the LoJack) 76 want unwitting thieves to continue
connecting to the internet and cellular towers so that the
company may track the thieves and gain remote access to
stolen smartphones.
The third factor above is related to whether
smartphone theft is targeted more at sensitive data than at
the hardware itself. While a stolen smartphone may fetch a
thief a few hundred dollars, access to financial apps, even
for a short period of time, may be far more valuable.
What thieves are targeting ties into kill switch
technical design choices as well. A software kill switch
could protect a phone from getting wiped and reset, but it
would not protect sensitive data encrypted on the
smartphone. A hardware kill switch would be more
secure, as described in Part V. However, while it would
protect encrypted personal data, it could make it possible
for thieves to reactivate the phone for resale. “We need to
understand what the motivation is in the theft before
instilling a solution,” says Greg Kazmierczak, CTO of
Wave Systems, a provider of hardware-based encryption
technology, “What’s the most valuable component — the
hardware or the data you are storing in your device?” 77

Absolute, supra note 44.
Jane Porter, Is a Mandatory Kill Switch the Solution to Smartphone
Theft?, FORTUNE (May 27, 2014, 7:26 PM),
http://fortune.com/2014/05/27/is-a-mandatory-kill-switchthe-solution-to-smartphone-theft.
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3. THIEVES MAY TRUST THE BLACK MARKET TO ENDRUN AROUND THE KILL SWITCH

Thieves, even if they learn of and care about the
effectiveness of kill switches, may still steal because they
have access to workarounds or are willing to wait for
them. In Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the Metro
transit system, Dan Stessel, pointed out that some stolen
smartphones could be resold through buy-back programs
like ecoATM kiosks that do not require face-to-face
transactions. 78 ecoATM responded with a statement: “Our
policy is not to knowingly purchase phones with Find My
iPhone activated, and we continue to improve our
technology to that end.” 79
Even if no mechanism for resale is available at the
time of theft, thieves may still impute some expected value
from the stolen phone by sitting and waiting for a hack or
new distribution stream. This is precisely what happened
with the doulCi hack mentioned above in Part V(B), where
pictures of groups of newly jailbroken iPhones appeared
on social media the day the hack was publicized. The
hackers posted server data corroborating claims that
“more than 5,700 devices [were hacked] in just five
minutes.” 80 Precedents like these encourage thieves that
“brickable” phones may still be worth stealing, so long as
waiting for a value-adding hack to come along is possible.
The assumptions in this section highlight the uncertain
effect a kill switch may have at deterring theft, if it even
has an effect at all.

B.

WHAT MINIMUM LEVEL OF KILL SWITCH
TECHNOLOGY WOULD SUFFICIENTLY DETER THEFT?

As discussed in Part V, a kill switch would be less
vulnerable to hacking or jailbreaking, as its level of
implementation gets lower. For higher levels of
implementation in software, a thief could jailbreak the

Id.
Id.
80 Heath, supra note 39.
78
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smartphone (done today for security apps installed on top
of the OS), replace the OS, edit the BIOS file, or wipe the
IMEI number (listed with increasing levels of difficulty
and therefore increasing levels of deterrence to theft). To
be more secure, a kill switch should be implemented at a
lower level or directly in hardware. However, the lower
the level of implementation and more secure the kill
switch, the more expensive it will be to design and
implement for manufacturers.

1. IN SEARCH OF AN OPTIMAL KILL SWITCH SOLUTION
Designing the best kill switch is an optimization
problem: what is the minimum level of kill switch
technology needed that will prove enough of a deterrence
to a thief? The most expensive military-style solutions
may not be needed as long as there is a sufficient
deterrence to reduce theft by a desired amount. As with
most optimization problems, an optimal solution would
depend on the value of the inputs and ensuring the correct
inputs have been chosen. It is hard to predict what factors
of a kill switch would be optimal. In Figure 1, we illustrate
an example graphical representation of theft deterrence
versus kill switch technology, showing how the cost of a
kill switch and the cost of cracking it could lead to an
optimal solution.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the potential relationship
between kill switch technology and levels of theft
deterrence.
Making no special effort has little to no theft
deterrence. Multiple carrier registries for difference
carriers and different wireless standards (CDMA, GSM,
and LTE) that carriers must only voluntarily consult
provides a slightly higher level of deterrence. Using a
single, shared carrier registry that carriers may be required
to use to block stolen IMEI numbers by law, as in the case
of Australia’s EMTA, provides an even higher level of theft
deterrence. Mandating the most secure (and expensive)
military-style solution, such as the Boeing black phone,
may provide the maximum possible level of theft
deterrence. However, the expense of implementing it may
not be commercially feasible: a cheaper hardware
implementation alternative may be provide nearly as
much deterrence at a far-reduced cost. The optimal
solution
may be a
mixed
software/hardware
implementation at the knee of the curve that provides a
high level amount of theft deterrence at a cheaper cost.
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2. A SIMPLISTIC MODEL OF THEFT BEHAVIOR
An empirical study on theft deterrence versus kill
switch technologies that takes into account factors such as
the notice of a kill switch to thieves, the amount of
implementation cost that industry is willing to absorb if
mandated by law, and the cost of jailbreaking each level of
kill switch technology would be useful to flesh out what an
optimal solution may look like. Finally, a study on
whether smartphone thieves are rational actors would be
useful. This is because models such as the one illustrated
above operate on a number of assumptions that may be
incorrect. The following simplified model of thieving
behavior demonstrates that—assuming thieves are rational
actors—much is unknown about why thefts occur. If a kill
switch solution misunderstands the reason for theft, it may
prove costly and ineffective. For example, a thief’s decision
in deciding to steal a smartphone can be represented by
the following equation.
Steal if: U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] > 𝑈𝑈[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|],
where U represents utility, E(phone) represents the
expected value of the stolen smartphone, and E(caught)
represents the expected value of getting caught.
U[E(phone)] may be calculated as follows.
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = {[1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)]}
+ {[𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) − 𝑝𝑝 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)]} + 𝛽𝛽,
where 𝛽𝛽 represents any extraneous positive or negative
utility (over the sale value) that a thief gets from
successfully stealing and selling a phone. Further,
U[|E(caught)|] may be calculated as follows.
U[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|] = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ∗ |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|
If we assume a 15% catch rate of thieves and a 75%
probability of a thief evading capture and encountering an
unbreakable kill switch, we have the following incentive
structure:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (.1)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] +
(.6)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)] + 𝛽𝛽.
To continue working through the simplified model,
assume a thief can net $200 profit on average for fencing a
jailbroken phone and a $100 profit on average from either
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selling the parts on a kill-switch-enabled phone or (if
available) paying a hacker to bypass the kill switch. A
thief can expect:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = 80 + 𝛽𝛽;
Steal if : 80 + 𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)
A rational thief will therefore steal the phone so
long as the expected value of stealing a phone (here, 80 +
𝛽𝛽) exceeds the expected value loss from being caught.
Assuming that 𝛽𝛽 is nominal and the probability of being
caught remains 15%, a rational thief will steal a phone
unless his expected value loss from being caught is greater
than roughly $533:
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 80,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 533
To take it a step further, even assuming that a thief
has a 100% chance of either being caught or encountering a
kill
switch
(say,
𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = .15
and
𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) = .85), the thief may still gain
utility from selling the parts or awaiting a hack to bypass
the switch:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (0)* 200 + (.7)* 100 + 𝛽𝛽 = 70 + 𝛽𝛽;
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: 70 + 𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡);
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 70,
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 467
Thus, a rational thief who fully comprehends the
existence and effect of a kill switch ubiquitous on all
phones could still decide to steal a phone, if only to make a
profit off of selling hardware or data on the black market.
Clearly, this exercise does not purport to represent
the reality of thieving behavior, but rather to show how
difficult it is to understand the rationale behind stealing a
phone. An endless number of additional assumptions can
be introduced to the model (such as a negative effect on
utility when encountering a kill-switch-enabled phone to
represent confusion), and the model still remains a gross
oversimplification of reality. The core assumption that
thieves are rational actors is also incredibly dubious. Most
phone thieves probably won’t bother to calculate a
detailed incentives equation like the one above, and thus
they may not respond well to changing incentives (like the
introduction of kill switches).
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C. COULD VIGILANTISM HURT
SAFETY OBJECTIVE?

THE

61

KILL SWITCH’S

The stated objective of both the SOS initiative and
the various kill switch bills in state legislatures is to
increase consumer safety by preventing (violent) theft.
However, only 11% of smartphone theft involves a robber
taking a smartphone from a person. 81 Moreover, 68% of
theft victims reported a willingness to resort to vigilantism
to recover their smartphones. 82 New apps such as Find
My iPhone offer GPS tracking capabilities for those
desperate to recover their smartphones, stirring worries
among law enforcement officials that people are putting
themselves and others in danger. 83 “Some have been
successful,” said George Gascón, the San Francisco district
attorney and a former police chief, “others have gotten
hurt.” 84
Pursuing a thief can lead to violence, especially
when people arm themselves—hammers are popular—
while hunting for stolen smartphones. A New Jersey man
was arrested after he tracked his stolen smartphone and
ended up attacking the wrong man, mistaking him for the
thief. 85
A kill switch could lead to increased violence in
three ways. First, the way in which it is implemented
could make it easier to track a stolen smartphone and take
the law into one’s own hands. Second, a thief who knows
that an owner can brick a stolen smartphone may violently
attack the owner during the robbery to prevent the owner
from recovering and “bricking” the stolen smartphone too

LOOKOUT, supra note5.
Id.
83 Ian Lovett, When Hitting ‘Find My iPhone’ Takes You to a Thief’s
Doorstep, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/when-hitting-findmy-iphone-takes-you-to-a-thiefs-doorstep.html.
84 Id.
85 Id.
81
82
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soon. Third, if the “bricked” smartphone displays the
owner’s address, as some security apps and MDM
solutions do, that could invite retribution from a frustrated
thief. 86 Further investigation of whether a kill switch
implementation would increase vigilantism and violence
above the level already occurring with apps such as Find
My iPhone is critical before defining a kill switch standard
and settling on a particular implementation.
However, vigilantism is also fueled by the
dismissive responses that victims of theft receive from
manufacturers and service carriers. For example, a victim
who tracked his stolen smartphone to a particular house
and called AT&T was given two options by the carrier:
either deactivate the phone and buy a new one, or find a
cop willing to subpoena AT&T for information, file a
lengthy police report, and go through a long bureaucratic
process. 87 Manufacturers and carriers have little incentive
to help a victim recover a device because the manufacturer
profits by hawking a replacement phone; and the carrier
profits by locking the crime victim into a new contract,
then opening an account with whomever ends up with the
stolen phone. 88 Carriers even profit from the specter of
phone theft, by selling expensive insurance policies to
protect their users. A mandatory kill switch could reverse
this trend and potentially reverse the need for vigilantism
by turning stolen smartphones worthless or promoting
their recovery.

D.

EXEMPT DEVICES
DETERRENCE

COULD

REDUCE

THEFT

As we describe in Part V, the millions of older
versions of smartphones still in use by the deployment
deadline would defeat the theft deterrence objective of the
kill switch legislation by around two years. In addition,
the presence of other exempt devices would also drag the
level of deterrence downward. For example, the California

MORLEY, supra note 68.
Swan, supra note 17.
88 Id.
86
87
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Senate Energy, Utilities, and Communication Committee
listed the following exempt devices that would not be
required to have a kill switch.
All devices that fall within the exception for
resale and pawnbrokers; All devices sold
out of state and brought into California; All
devices currently in the market, which
customers typically replace every 18 to 24
months; All devices provided “free” as part
of a promotion or a wireless lifeline plan;
and All devices that, even if rendered
inoperable by a kill switch, may have value
for parts. 89
Such devices would continue to have value for resale on
the black market. Moreover, the potentially large number
of such devices in use would incentivize thieves to take
their chances with a kill switch and continue with
smartphone theft.

E. The Power of Default
The various pieces of legislation mandating a kill
switch for smartphones have provisions stating that each
smartphone sold must have the kill switch enabled but
that consumers should have the ability to disable the kill
switch upon purchase. On the other hand, the CTIA and
third-party security app vendors such as Absolute would
prefer that any kill switch be deployed on an opt-in basis,
with consumers choosing whether to opt in to the
program. While an opt-in program puts consumer choice
front and center in deciding how a kill switch would be
deployed, the choice of whether a kill switch program is

89 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications
Committee, March 24, 2014,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis
tab, then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And
Communications”).
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opt-in or opt-out will have a significant impact of whether
kill switches will be adopted
by the majority of
smartphone owners.
The choice of the default position is based on three
assumptions from behavioral economics. First, more
consumers stay with the default than would choose to do
so if forced to choose. 90 Second, only consumers who
prefer the opt-out choice will opt out. And third, where
carriers oppose the default position, they will be forced to
explain it to smartphone owners, resulting in wellinformed decisions by consumers. However, Professor
Willis asserts, in the privacy context, that these
assumptions are unlikely to hold.
The default position, such as an opt-in kill switch,
favored by companies is often surrounded by a powerful
campaign to keep consumers there, but a default position
set contrary to company interests can be met with an
equally powerful campaign to drive consumers out. 91
Therefore, companies can either bolster the mechanisms
behind the inertia that leads consumers to stick with
defaults or they can weaken them to induce consumers to
opt out. Rather than forcing companies to facilitate
consumer exercise of informed choice, many defaults leave
companies with opportunities to play on consumer biases
or confuse consumers into sticking with or opting out of
the default. 92 However, to really deter theft, smartphones
will require near–100 % adoption, such that thieves stop
taking the chance that a given smartphone will have the
kill switch disabled.

F. TRACKING LOCAL SMARTPHONE SALES
INCREASED PENALTIES FOR IMEI WIPING

AND

In 2013, New York State Senate Co-Leader Jeffrey
Klein and Assemblyman Jeff Dinowitz, Chair of the
Assembly’s Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee,

Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 61 (forthcoming 2014).
91 Id.
92 Id..
90
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introduced new legislation to require smartphone sellers to
prove that they are the rightful owners of the phones they
sell. 93 The objective of the legislation is to curtail the local
black market for stolen smartphones. Non-compliant
sellers face the possibility of steep fines or jail time. 94 The
state lawmakers hope that this legislation would stop
stolen smartphones being sold at neighborhood stores,
laundromats, and flea market stands.
The legislation would require smartphone sellers to
provide detailed receipts for every phone sold, including
the IMEI number. It is hoped that these records could
provide additional information on how and where stolen
phones move in the marketplace. However, Arieanna
Schweber of Absolute Software claims that although the
bill could make the sale of stolen mobile phones locally
more difficult, it will not diminish the demand for stolen
devices. 95
This is because the majority of stolen
smartphones are now being shipped abroad. Therefore,
local legislation will likely be inadequate to address the
global issue.
Also in 2013, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer
reintroduced legislation that would make it a federal crime
to wipe an IMEI number by imposing a five-year criminal
penalty. 96 Senator Schumer noted that without a criminal
penalty for tampering with IMEI numbers, thieves could
simply alter the IMEI number to evade carrier registries
and reactivate a smartphone phone. Because the bill has
the full support of the CTIA and the FCC, it could prevent
reactivation of stolen smartphones. However, it may have
little deterrence value if smartphones are primarily being
stolen for an international black market.

S. 5976, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22761(c) (West 2014) (“The
knowing retail sale of a smartphone in California . . . may be
subject to a civil penalty”).
95 Arieanna Schweber, New York Legislators Propose Law to Reduce
Black Market for Mobile Devices, INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://theft319.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=16105444&item=
24.
96 S. 1070, 112th Cong. (2013).
93
94
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ADDITIONAL CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL
DIFFICULTIES OF A MANDATORY KILL SWITCH

A government-mandated kill switch, as opposed to
allowing individuals to make their own security choices,
raises several additional concerns and risks of misuse and
surveillance.

A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL
Although Internet companies and government
agencies already track bulk and targeted data on the
Internet, individuals today have the ability to erase and
block tracking cookies, prevent the transmission of
specified local data, and even use encryption technology,
given enough technical savvy. 97 However, mandatory
phone kill switches have the potential to significantly
increase government surveillance and control over speech
and political behavior. On August 11, 2011, the Bay Area
Rapid Transit system (BART) shut down cellphone service
to four stations in San Francisco in response to a planned
protest, because in July 2011 protesters disrupted BART
service in response to the fatal shooting of a passenger by
BART police. 98 BART first approached carriers directly and
asked them to turn off service. Later, a BART officer
asserted that “BART staff or contractors shut down power
to the nodes and alerted the cell carriers” after the fact. 99 A
smartphone kill switch that the government can control by
exerting authority over carriers could even more greatly
empower the government to squelch political protests by
disrupting smartphone service and making organization

Thomas Claburn, Kill Switches: Phones Just the Start,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:06 AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobiledevices/kill-switches-phones-just-the-start/d/d-id/1113887.
98 Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 12, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubaraksan-francisco.
99 Id. (quoting James Allison, deputy chief communications
officer for BART).
97
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and coordination of citizen movements or protests
difficult.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) compared
BART’s actions with those of former President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt who ordered the shutdown of cellphone
service in Tahrir Square in response to peaceful,
democratic protests in 2011. 100 Moreover, British Prime
Minister David Cameron is considering new, broad
censorship powers over social networks, such as Facebook
and Twitter and mobile communication in the UK. 101 The
ability to peremptorily control smartphone kill switches
could have grave concerns for free speech and democracy.
However, BART was able to shut down cellphones
without a kill switch. Therefore, whether kill switches
really represent a broad enlargement of the government’s
power requires information on how much a kill switch
would add to the government’s current ability to turn off
smartphone communications. The advantage of a kill
switch that the government has the ability to control is that
it could prevent theft of trade secrets and national secrets
from stolen smartphones.
Further study would be
welcome on how this would work with or without the
consent of the smartphone’s owner.

B. INSECURE NON-OWNER CONTROL
As the CTIA points out, even if a kill switch is
technologically feasible, it could have serious risks. If a
mandatory kill switch is created, every smartphone would
have the capability. Depending on the implementation, the
“kill” message could be known to every operator and
could not be kept secret. 102 A private party with malicious

Id.
James Kirkup, UK Riots: Tougher Powers Could Curb Twitter,
THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:20 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697142/U
K-riots-tougher-powers-could-curb-Twitter.html.
102 CTIA, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the Answer,
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer
.pdf.
100
101
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intent could therefore replicate the “kill” message, such as
a text or other message sent to the smartphone to disable
it. In another scenario, if “killing” a smartphone requires a
call to the carrier, that call could be placed by an identity
theft who does not possess the smartphone or an abusive
spouse who actually owns the family account to which his
wife’s smartphone is tied. Where a smartphone is disabled
by the malicious use of a “kill switch,” the safety of the
user may be jeopardized, as in the abusive spouse
scenario, because the wife will be unable to make
emergency calls.
By sending multiple messages, such as by
incrementing the telephone number or IMEI number,
groups of smartphones could be disabled. This could be
used to disable entire groups of customers, such as the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland
Security or emergency services and law enforcement. 103 If
the kill switch is a permanent switch, a smartphone could
be disabled forever. The risk of denial of service could be
far too large. Therefore, the carrier community maintains
that control of operation (and denial of service) be
embedded in the network and not at the smartphonelevel. 104

C. FARADAY BAG WORKAROUNDS
Driven by high prices for non-contract
smartphones overseas, the underground trade of stolen
smartphones has now become a global enterprise that
connects violent street thieves in American cities with
buyers as far away as Hong Kong, according to law
enforcement and the wireless industry. Jerry Deaven, an
agent with the Department of Homeland Security, which is
tasked with preventing the trafficking of stolen goods, told
The Huffington Post that traffickers are responsible for “a
tremendous amount of phones being shipped out of the
country,” adding that “some organizations are shipping a

103
104
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couple million dollars worth of phones per month.” 105
Some stolen smartphones are placed into Faraday Bags
immediately after being stolen to block GPS tracking.
Further study is required on whether a Faraday Bag could
be used to circumvent a kill switch, and, if so, whether a
smartphone stolen in the U.S. could then be activated
abroad. How about a stolen smartphone with a “kill
switch” taken from California in a Faraday Bag to Arizona
or Nevada, states without corresponding kill switch
legislation. Ultimately the answers to these questions will
help determine whether a kill switch would be a better
solution than carrier registries, and, if so, help drive the
design of an optimal kill switch.

D. MINIMIZING
OWNERS

THE

BURDEN

ON

SMARTPHONE

Finally, the amount of user effort needed to deal
with kill switch systems, including notifying carriers in the
event of theft or loss, reversing the data wipe and "unbricking" a smartphone after recovery, or heading off the
kill command in the event a misplaced smartphone is
found, should not burden smartphone owners in the same
way passwords do. For example, computer users today
are required or strongly encouraged to employ different,
long, and complicated passwords on each of multiple
devices: laptops, tablets, desktops; and multiple accounts:
financial websites, health websites, company logins,
Google, etc. 106
The Office of California Attorney General Kamala
Harris advises users and businesses on computer security,

Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for
Smartphones, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/smartphoneblack-market_n_3510341.html?utm_hp_ref=iphone-theft.
106 Chenda Ngak, The 25 Most Common Passwords of 2013, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:14 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-25-most-commonpasswords-of-2013 (“[T]he top three passwords of [2013] are
‘123456,’ ‘password’ and ‘12345678’.”).
105
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including using firewalls, anti-virus software, and complex
passwords. 107 However, passwords have done little to
prevent hacking of sensitive information and cyberattacks. California businesses and the government have
experienced 300 separate data breaches exposing the
personal information of more than 20 million customer
accounts during the past two years. 108 Complex password
requirements therefore simply burden users without
actually preventing hacking. Any proposed kill switch
technology and carrier response protocols should be
designed to minimize the burden on users while
burdening smartphone thieves instead. A study on the
lessons the industry or analysts have learned from the
failed decades-long password experiment would be useful
to prevent repeating this costly mistake on smartphone kill
switches.

VIII.

EFFECTIVENESS
OF
STATE
LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES: PATCHWORK REGULATION IN A
NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE

The decentralized nature of the mandatory kill
switch movement presents a host of concerns for proper
implementation of an effective and democratic solution.
The practical reality of state-by-state piecemeal legislation
is that the bigger, more influential states tend to drive
policy. Thus, while Minnesota has passed its kill switch
legislation and gained a first mover’s advantage,
pragmatically the bill only applies to phones sold or
purchased new in Minnesota. This is not to say that
threats of foreclosing a state market will have no effect on
phone providers—risking infringement of the Minnesota

State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Is Your
Computer Secure?, http://oag.ca.gov/privacy/facts/onlineprivacy/computer-secure.
108 Don Thompson, California to Step Up Cybersecurity Efforts
After Hundreds of DatauBreaches, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2014, 10:26 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_25240431/californi
a-step-up-cybersecurity-efforts-after-hundreds-data.
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bill may encourage all phone manufacturers and carriers to
comply with the kill switch mandate.
However,
patchwork state mandates of kill switches may do little to
deter thieves, particularly where there is doubt over where
the phone was bought.
The real test of the legislation’s viability (and the
site of potential legal challenges) however arises in the
larger states where more phones are sold.
Hence,
California and New York are the likely battlegrounds for
policy development and industry regulation. Because
roughly one-eighth of all Americans live in California, and
Apple and Google are based there, the California law may
very well produce an immediate national default. 109
This potential California effect risks legislating
national policy at the state level and may very well
overstep the ability of other democratically elected leaders
to have a say in how kill switches should be adopted, if
they should at all. The CTIA claims, for instance, that the
Minnesota bill creates interstate commerce concerns
“because it heavily burdens the national wireless device
and service market by dictating operational and technical
specifications of mobile devices.” 110 At the same time,
coordinating state legislation is potentially challenging,
unnecessary, and time-consuming. According to the
Secure Our Smartphones initiative, twenty-three state
Attorneys General support the proposal, among many

Wagenseil, supra note 16. See also Elizabeth Weise, Google,
Microsoft to add “kill switches” to phones, USA Today (June 20,
2014, 3:11 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/20/googlemicrosoft-kill-switches/11083511/.
110 Jamie Hastings, Vice President of External & State Affairs,
CTIA—The Wireless Association, Testimony in Opposition to
Minnesota House File 1952, Minnesota House Commerce and
Consumer Protection Finance and Policy Committee, March 19,
2014, http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/LegislativeActivity/ctia-testimony-in-opposition-to-minnesota-house-file1952-requiring-kill-switches-on-mobile-devices.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
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other district attorneys and other state political figures. 111
Many of these states whose attorneys general support a
mandatory kill switch may simply prefer to conserve
political resources and allow other states, like California, to
drive the policy. Kill switch opponents, however, will
then likely argue that such a proposal has no opportunity
to be debated by democratically elected state
representatives, who may have valuable input on the
matter.
In truth, kill switch bills are not passing
legislatures easily. There are only five state bills and one
federal bill passed or pending, and California’s version
was rejected once in the state senate before narrowly
passing recently. 112 The federal kill switch bill, which
would pose fewer of the risks that accompany state
piecemeal legislation, has experienced little movement
since being announced in February 2014.
Technological mandates in general are difficult to
accomplish successfully by government legislation, much
less state-by-state legislation. As the CTIA explains, there
is little reason to “limit consumer choice by mandating the
use of any solution . . . [because] [a]ny mandated
technology standard will quickly become outdated in the
fast-moving world of wireless applications and
technology.” 113 The private sector’s hesitance to accept
government technology mandates is not unreasonable,
particularly in a sector of rapid innovation like mobile
phones. Politicians, many of whom have little technical
comprehension of the issue, are likely not the ideal
decision-makers on how technology must be used.
Nonetheless, there is a fitting example of an
effective technological mandate on a similar issue as the
smartphone kill switch. Car theft laws, passed in the 1980s
and 1990s, successfully decreased auto theft by increasing

111 Secure Our Smartphone Initiative Members, Office of New
York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sos/initiative-members.
112 Chloe Albanesius, California State Senate Rejects Smartphone
Kill-Switch Bill, PC MAGAZINE (April 25, 2014, 10:35 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2457117,00.asp.
113 Jamie Hastings, supra note 110.
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penalties for thieves and mandating implementation of
anti-theft vehicle identification numbers on the engine,
transmission, and other main body parts (which became
illegal to remove). 114 This movement, however, was aided
in large part by federal legislation, namely the 1984 Motor
Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act, which federally
implemented the above, and the 1994 Motor Vehicle Theft
Prevention Act, which mandated federal cooperation with
states to create an opt-in program whereby volunteers
would consent to law enforcement stopping the car if it
were operated in certain conditions (such as late at
night). 115 Further, the anti-auto-theft movement had
federal oversight of exported cars to check for owner
vehicle identification numbers. 116
Clearly, no such solution is viable for smartphones,
which are smaller and harder to track.
While no
authoritative data exists on this point, the international
black market certainly provides an integral boon to
smartphone theft.
Especially in countries where
smartphones are not widely imported, stolen phones can
sell for incredibly high amounts that only reinforce the
motive to internationally traffic stolen phones. In March
2013, California charged two men with operating a stolen
phone trafficking ring to Hong Kong from which they
made over $4 million in a year. 117 Another man being
charged reportedly bought iPhones from people at coffee
shops for $250 to $350 and trafficked them on his person to
Vietnam, eleven at a time, making trips as often as he
could, apparently making enough profit to justify the

National Auto Auction Association, History of Auto Theft
Legislation: Federal Legislation, (accessed June 5, 2014),
http://www.naaa.com/NAAA_Legislative/history_autotheft.html.
115 Id.
116 Id. (under the 1984 Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement
Act).
117 Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for
Smartphones, Huffington Post (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/smartphoneblack-market_n_3510341.html.
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trips. 118 Anecdotes such as these highlight the limits with
even a comprehensive federal regulation aimed at
deterring smartphone theft. A patchwork approach of kill
switch mandates risks exploitation by both inter-state
limitations and international black market workarounds.
Mandatory kill switches, regardless of how effective they
may seem, face many roadblocks to attaining their stated
goal of deterring theft.

IX. CONCLUSIONS
QUESTIONS

AND A

CONCISE LIST

OF

OPEN

As we have shown in this paper, the stakeholders
in the kill switch debate, including legislators, smartphone
manufacturers, and carriers are each operating on the basis
of a large number of assumptions and unknowns,
including the following:
•

•

•

•

•

What an optimal technical implementation of a kill
switch at no additional cost to the consumer would
be, including whether it should be implemented in
software, hardware, or an automated form of the
present manual IMEI blocking registries;
What role MDM solutions and carrier registries
will play in or out of an environment in which kill
switches are deployed;
Whether the large increase in smartphone theft is
because thieves are specially targeting smartphones
or whether smartphone theft is only incidental or
unrelated to typical robberies;
Whether an effective kill switch will actually deter
theft or only incentivize them to ship more stolen
smartphones to the international black market; and
Whether a kill switch presents concerns, such as
government surveillance and malicious activation
or circumvention.

In addition to the assumptions and unknowns
above, there are significant practical concerns about
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actually implementing a kill switch at no cost to the
consumer across varying industry smartphone platforms
and operating systems by the legislation’s deadline of July
1, 2015. A necessary first step to such an implementation
would be for the wireless industry to properly define kill
switch standards so each manufacturer could conform
their hardware, operating systems, and design platform
accordingly. The short runway presented by the state bills
allows very little time for such standard-setting activity.
Requiring a solution too soon may not consider the
balance between (1) the nature, urgency and magnitude of
the problem, and (2) the cost, harm to innovation, and
burden on the wireless industry of any mandated change.
For example, in discussing the possibility of adding a theftresistant “kill switch” to future iPhone models, Apple
noted that the next two generations of the iPhone have
already been developed, and were designed before Steve
Jobs’s death in late 2011. 119 Therefore, the challenges of
effectively implementing a technological mandate too
quickly could be a significant burden on smartphone
manufacturers to modify their planned pipeline of designs.
Developing sound policy to deter smartphone theft
would therefore benefit from more in-depth investigation
of smartphone theft psychology, the mechanics of the
black market for smartphones, the merits of technological
solutions, and how to most effectively implement an
overall solution. The time for such investigation is now, as
the landmark California legislation’s mandate goes into
effect on July 1, 2015.

APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There are four state bills and one federal bill
demanding mandatory kill switches: California S.B. 962;
Minnesota H.B. 1952; Illinois S.B. 3539; New York A.B.
8984; and the federal Smartphone Theft Prevention Act,

Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov’t Rep Says Next Two iPhones Were
Designed Under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:03 PM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-repsays-next-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.
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H.R. 4065. Minnesota’s bill was signed into law on May
14, 2014, while California’s bill passed the state senate on
May 8, 2014 and became law on August 25, 2014. What
follows is a brief description of key text from the bills.
California legislation S.B. 962 applies to
smartphones manufactured and sold in California on or
after July 1, 2015. It requires these smartphones to
“[i]nclude a technological solution . . . [that] can render the
essential features of the smartphone inoperable to an
unauthorized user” (emphasis added). This technological
solution “may consist of software, hardware, or a
combination of both software and hardware.” Here are
some selected quotes from the bill, with underlines of key
phrases:
•

•

•

•

•

“The technological solution should be able to
withstand a hard reset or operating system
downgrade, come preequipped, and the default
setting of the solution shall be to prompt the
consumer to enable the solution during the
initial device setup.”
“‘Essential features’ of a smartphone are the
ability to use the device for voice
communications, text messaging, and browse
the Internet, including the ability to access and
use mobile software applications.”
“The technological solution shall be reversible,
so that if the rightful owner obtains possession
of the device after the essential features of the
smartphone have been rendered inoperable, the
operation of those essential features can be
restored by an authorized user.”
“An authorized user of a smartphone may
affirmatively elect to disable or opt-out of
enabling the technological solution at any
time.”
“In order to be effective, antitheft technological
solutions need to be ubiquitous, as thieves
cannot distinguish between those smartphones
that have the solutions enabled and those that
do not.”
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“The Legislature finds and declares that the
enactment of a uniform policy to deter thefts of
smartphones and to protect the privacy of
smartphone users if their smartphones are
involuntarily acquired by others is a matter of
statewide concern.”

Minnesota H.B. 1952, now passed as law, becomes
effective on July 1, 2015 on all smartphones sold or
purchased new in Minnesota. It provides that these
smartphones “must be equipped with technology
designed to render the device inoperable in the event of
theft or loss.” Here are some selected quotes from the bill:
•

•
•

•

•

“Smart phone does not include an electronic
reader, tablet, or other similar device not
primarily intended for two-way voice
communication.”
“[Must] be reversible in the event of the smart
phone’s recovery by its owner”
“Lock all of the smart phone’s user data, and
ensure that it is only accessible to the user or a
law enforcement officer subject to a valid search
warrant”
“Render the smart phone core functionality
inoperable on any wireless telecommunications
service provider’s network globally”
“Prevent the smart phone from being
reactivated without a passcode or other similar
authorization, even if the device is
reprogrammed, is turned off and subsequently
turned back on, has its network connectivity
disabled and subsequently re-enabled, or has
its SIM card removed”

New York’s proposed A.B. 8984 (which did not
make it out of the legislative committee) would be
applicable to any advanced mobile communications device
sold in New York on or after July 1, 2015, with “advanced
mobile communications device” defined very similarly to
California’s definition with the exception of including
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tablets.
A.B. 8984’s description of the kill switch
functionality is also highly similar to California’s, and its
legislative intent tracks the rationale of California as well.
The following two quotes are also of note:
•

•

“It is the further intent of the legislature to
prohibit any term or condition in a service
contract between a customer and a commercial
mobile radio service provider that requires or
encourages the customer to disable the
technological solution that renders the
customer’s smartphone or other advanced
communications device useless if stolen.”
“The rightful owner of an advanced mobile
communications device may affirmatively elect
to disable the technological solution after sale.
However, the physical acts necessary to disable
to the technological solution may only be
performed by the end-use consumer or a
person specifically selected by the end-use
consumer to disable the technological solution
and shall not be physically performed by any
retail seller of the advanced mobile
communications device.”

Illinois proposed S.B. 3539 (which did not make it
out of the legislative committee) would apply immediately
upon passage to any smartphones manufactured and sold
in Illinois. S.B. 3539 is similar to the other legislation, but
uniquely would require all violating providers to insure
the phones at no cost to the consumer, rather than levying
a per-phone monetary penalty. The following quotes are
of note:
•

“‘Smartphone’ means a cellular phone that is
built on a mobile operating system and
possesses advanced computing capability.
Features a smart phone may possess include,
but are not limited to, built-in applications,
Internet access, digital voice service, text
messaging, e-mail, and Internet browsing.”
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“[P]ermanently remove all saved data on the
device”
“[R]ender the smart phone completely
inoperable on any wireless telephone service
provider’s network, including a wireless
telephone service provider’s global network”
“[P]revent the smart phone from being
reactivated or reprogrammed without a
password or other similar authorization”
“[D]isable the device even if it is turned off or
the SIM card or other data storage medium is
removed”
“[B]e reversible if the device is recovered by its
owner.”

The federal proposed Smartphone Theft Prevention
Act, H.R. 4065, would have applied beginning January 1,
2015 on any mobile device manufactured in the U.S. or
imported for sale to the public in the U.S. (it did not make
it out of legislative committee). It would have covered any
“‘mobile device’ [which] means a personal electronic
device on which commercial mobile service or commercial
mobile data service is provided” and included an
exemption for any technology that “accomplishes the
functional equivalent of the function” defined in the bill as
being able to remotely and costlessly:
•

•

•

“Delete or render inaccessible from the device
all information relating to the account holder
that has been placed on the device”
“Render the device inoperable on the network
of any provider of commercial mobile service or
commercial mobile data service globally, even
if the device is turned off or has the data
storage medium removed”
“Prevent the device from being reactivated or
reprogrammed without a passcode or similar
authorization after the device has been
rendered inoperable or subject to an
unauthorized factory reset”
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•

“[R]everse any action . . . if the device is
recovered by the account holder.”

In response to these pieces of legislation, the CTIA
has produced its own voluntary opt-in commitment for
carriers and manufacturers. The main provisions are as
follows:
•

•

•

•

Remote wipe the authorized user’s data that is
on the smartphone in the event it is lost or
stolen.
Render the smartphone inoperable to an
unauthorized user (e.g., locking the smartphone
so it cannot be used without a password or
PIN), except in accordance with FCC rules for
911 emergency communications, and if
available, emergency numbers programmed by
the authorized user (e.g., “phone home”).
Prevent reactivation without authorized user’s
permission (including unauthorized factory
reset attempts) to the extent technologically
feasible
Reverse the inoperability if the smartphone is
recovered by the authorized user and restore
user data on the smartphone to the extent
feasible (e.g., restored from the cloud).

